Philosophy of Mind Workshop 2006-11-29
"Self to Self"
On November 1st, the workshop met in Cobb 103 to discuss David Velleman's paper, "Self to Self".PART IJason introduced the paper by pointing out how Velleman distinguishes the psychological sense of self from the metaphysical sense of personal identity. Velleman is concerned with conditions of selfhood through time. Roughly, what makes a future or a past self mine is my ability to anticipate certain experiences or have certain intentions or memories without needing to identify whose experiences, intentions, or memories they are. That ability is distinguished from the activity of imaginitive identification with someone else, e.g. Napoleon.I can imagine that I am Napoleon by imagining certain experiences as being had by Napoleon from a first-personal point of view: how the smoke and noise of Austerlitz must have seemed to him, for example. This kind of imaginitive identification requires imagining having ...
read moremore posts from Philosophy of Mind Workshop
- Mind Workshop Alumni
- From the Workshop Archives: Sense and Sensibilia
- From the Workshop Archives: Making It Explicit
- From the Workshop Archives: Naming and Necessity
- Frege Hair Color Center
- The World's Smallest Tractatus
- THE History of Western Philosophy?
- Metaphysics Mix Tape!
- Epistemology Muxtape!
- Philosophy of Language Muxtape!
- Philosophy of Mind Muxtape!
- Painted Leaves, Desperate Smiles and Radical Contextualism
- Demonstrative Thoughts About A City
- Conceptual Art and Philosophy
- Philosophical Imitations
- Philosophy of Mind Workshop Hiatus
- First Meeting of the Year!
- Philosophy Audio
- Brandom's Locke Lectures
- Davidson Video Series
- Can You Have a Demonstrative Thought About a Color?
- McKinney on Biosemantics; Lewis on Experience
- David Velleman
- Martin Gustafsson: "What is a Context?"
- Winter Quarter Update
- Justin Shaddock, "Passive Experience and the Freedom of Spontaneity"
- David Velleman, The Possibility of Practical Reason, "Introduction" (Part II)
- David Velleman, The Possibility of Practical Reason, "Introduction" (Part I)
- Second Meeting of the Winter Quarter
- First Meeting of Winter Quarter
- Philosophers on Film: Strawson and Evans Chat
- "Self to Self"
- First Velleman Reading
- First Meeting of the Year
- Mind Workshop, Fall Quarter
- Mind Workshop Logo (Prototype)
- Late Summer
- Mind Workshop: Summer Vacation
- Final Workshop Meeting of the Year: Sense and Sensibilia, Chapters X and XI
- Sense and Sensibilia, Chapters VIII and IX
- Tom Baldwin: Perception, Reference, Causation
- J.L. Austin, Sense and Sensibilia, Chapters V-VII
- Lowe on McTaggart's Argument for the Unreality of Time
- Mind Workshop This Week: J.L. Austin and The Indexical Fallacy in McTaggart's Proof of the Unreality of Time