The Space of Reasons 2007-05-03

Boghossian-Style Incompatibilism (Part 2)

In my previous post I outline a reductio against compatibilism. However, I believe the compatibilist has good reason reject (R4) of the reductio. Underlying (R4) is the implicit assumption that a subject can only have privileged access to the fact that she is thinking some thought θ if she is able to distinguish it, from some other thought θ*, without consulting her environment. However, the compatibilist has good (independent) grounds to reject this assumption, and with it, (R4). For example, Falvey and Owens [1994] distinguish between ‘introspective knowledge of content’ and ‘introspective knowledge of comparative content’: (*) An individual knows the contents of his occurrent thoughts and beliefs authoritatively and directly (that is, without relying on inferences from observation of his environment). Call this kind of knowledge introspective knowledge of content. (**) With respect to any two of his thoughts ...

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