Philosophy, et cetera 2008-05-25

Is Knowledge (Ever) Indefeasible?

My old thread on the surprise examination paradox has seen an interesting revival of discussion. Along the way, Pablo claims:If someone knows that Q, that person cannot be thrown into a state of epistemic confusion regarding Q.I doubt this. It seems that in many cases knowledge can be undercut when we acquire further (perhaps misleading) beliefs. I may see (and hence know) that the widgets are red, until I form the defeating belief that they are irradiated by red light. Similarly, if an apparently infallible source ('God') tells me that I can't know that Q, his assertion may be self-fulfilling, by raising doubts and plunging me into a state of epistemic confusion and uncertainty that is incompatible with full-blown knowledge.On the other hand, the unrestricted claim that epistemic doubts are self-fulfilling leads to contradiction when combined with other plausible assumptions ...

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