Philosophy, et cetera 2008-07-24

Evidence, Reasons and Normative Doubts

Follow-up to Introducing 'Merely Normative' Risk.Andrew Sepielli (in correspondence) points out that empirical and normative hypotheses alike can fit into the following schema:1. If hypothesis H obtains, then I have objective reason not to φ.2. There is some non-zero subjective probability that H obtains.3. Therefore, I have belief-relative reason not to φ.One immediate problem is that subjective or 'belief-relative' reasons (the sorts of things that follow directly from one's arbitrary beliefs) have no normative significance. Practical rationality is instead a matter of evidence-relative reasons. So let's amend the schema slightly: 1. If hypothesis H obtains, then I have objective reason not to φ.2. Given my evidence, there is some non-zero probability that H obtains.3. Therefore, I have evidence-relative reason not to φ.Premise (2) arguably only makes sense for contingent, empirical hypotheses. Since purely normative claims are non-contingent, there are not ...

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