The Space of Reasons 2008-08-18
Why Questions and Rational Agents
In this post I continue to limn a novel theory of action. I hold that an intentional agent counts as a rational agent if and only if that agent is responsive to should-questions. Examples of should questions include: “Should Sue have a third glass of wine?”, “Should I believe in God?” and “Should I desire revenge?” To ask if Sue should have a third glass of wine is to ask if having a third glass of wine is good. This gives rise to the following question. If having a desire already involves an appearance of the good (as I have claimed), then does not Sue’s desire for a third glass of wine already entail an affirmative answer to the question “is having a third glass of wine good?” I hold that in the case of animals that are unable to ...
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